4 August 1942

4 August 1942


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4 August 1942

August

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War at Sea

German submarine U-372 sunk off Jaffa



U.S. and Mexico sign the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement

On August 4, 1942, the United States and Mexico sign the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement, creating what is known as the "Bracero Program." The program, which lasted until 1964, was the largest guest-worker program in U.S. history. Throughout its existence, the Bracero Program benefited both farmers and laborers but also gave rise to numerous labor disputes, abuses of workers and other problems that have long characterized the history of farm labor in the Southwestern United States.

The program was born from necessity, as the federal government worried that American entry into World War II would sap the Southwest of much of its farm labor. Manual laborers (braceros in Spanish) from Mexico became an important part of the region&aposs economy, and the program outlasted the war. The program guaranteed workers a number of basic protections, including a minimum wage, insurance and safe, free housing however, farm owners frequently failed to live up to these requirements. Housing and food routinely proved to be well below standards, and wages were not only low but also frequently paid late or not at all. Years after the program ended, many braceros were still fighting to receive the money that had been deducted from their salaries and allegedly put into savings accounts. Due to these broken promises, strikes were a common occurrence throughout this period.

Over 4.6 million contracts were issued over the 22 years of the Bracero Program. Though Congress let the program expire in 1964, it set the stage for decades of labor disputes and a dynamic of migrant labor that still exists today. The 60s and 70s saw the rise of the United Farm Workers, a union composed largely of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, which continued fighting many of the same inequalities that faced the braceros. To this day, migrant labor from Mexico continues to be a vital part of the Southwestern economy as well as a source of political and racial tension.


Contents

Operations at Guadalcanal Edit

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Island in the eastern Solomon Islands. The landings were meant to deny their use to the Japanese as bases, especially the nearly completed airfield at Henderson Field that was being constructed on Guadalcanal. If Japanese air and sea forces were allowed to establish forward operating bases in the Eastern Solomons they would be in a position to threaten the supply shipping routes between the U.S. and Australia. The Allies also wanted to use the islands as launching points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons, isolate or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul, and support the Allied New Guinea campaign, which was then building strength under General Douglas MacArthur. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign. [10]

The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi operation was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover. U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered the 16,000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi. [11] : 14 Also under Turner was Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley's screening force of eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and five minesweepers. This force was to protect Turner's ships and provide gunfire support for the landings. Crutchley commanded his force of mostly American ships from his flagship, the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia. [1] : 621–24

The Allied landings took the Japanese by surprise. The Allies secured Tulagi, nearby islets Gavutu and Tanambogo, and the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal by nightfall on August 8. [11] : 14–15 On August 7 and 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ship George F. Elliott (which sank later) and heavily damaging the destroyer USS Jarvis. [12] : 90–103 In these air attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, including 14 carrier-based fighter aircraft. [1] : 80

Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' fuel levels, Fletcher announced that he would be withdrawing his carrier task forces on the evening of August 8. [13]

Some historians contend that Fletcher's fuel situation was not at all critical but that Fletcher used it to justify his withdrawal from the battle area. [1] : 94 [11] : 28 [12] : 104–05 Fletcher's biographer notes that Fletcher concluded that the landing was a success and that no important targets for close air support were at hand. Being concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo-bomber strikes, and, wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived, withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift. Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on August 9. [14]

Even though the unloading was going more slowly than planned, Turner decided that without carrier air cover he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart the next day. [11] : 59

Japanese response Edit

Unprepared for the Allied operation at Guadalcanal, the initial Japanese response included airstrikes and an attempted reinforcement. Mikawa, commander of the newly formed Japanese Eighth Fleet headquartered at Rabaul, loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them towards Guadalcanal on August 7. When the Japanese learned that Allied forces at Guadalcanal were stronger than originally reported, the transports were recalled. [1] : 87 [12] : 126 [15]

Mikawa also assembled all the available warships in the area to attack the Allied forces at Guadalcanal. At Rabaul were the heavy cruiser Chōkai (Mikawa's flagship), the light cruisers Tenryū and Yūbari and the destroyer Yūnagi. En route from Kavieng were four heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 under Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto: Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa. [16] : 193–94 [17] : 21 [18]

The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night-fighting tactics before the war, a fact of which the Allies were unaware. [12] : 43–44 [19] Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of August 8 and 9, when he could employ his night-battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa's warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George in the evening of August 7 and then headed east-southeast. [11] : 19 [17] : 21

Prelude Edit

Mikawa decided to take his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville. The fleet would pause east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of August 8. (This would avoid daytime air attacks during their final approach to Guadalcanal.) [12] : 126 They would then proceed along the dangerous channel known as "The Slot", hoping that no Allied plane would see them in the fading light. The Japanese fleet was in fact sighted in St George Channel, where their column almost ran into USS S-38, lying in ambush. She was too close to fire torpedoes, but her captain, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Munson, radioed: "Two destroyers and three larger ships of unknown type heading one four zero true at high speed eight miles west of Cape St George" [9] : 355 Once at Bougainville, Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area to mask the composition of his force and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to scout for Allied ships in the southern Solomons. At 10:20 and 11:10, his ships were spotted by Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea. [1] : 88 [20] The first Hudson misidentified them as "three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders". (Note: Some accounts state that the first Hudson's crew identified the enemy ships correctly, but the composition of enemy forces was changed from the aircraft crews' report by intelligence officers in Milne Bay.) The Hudson's crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea. Receiving no acknowledgment, they returned to Milne Bay at 12:42 to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible. The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio, but completed its patrol and landed at Milne Bay at 15:00. It reported sighting "two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type". For unknown reasons, these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively, on August 8. [12] : 139–50 [21] U.S. official historian Samuel Morison wrote in his 1949 account that the RAAF Hudson's crew failed to report the sighting until after they had landed and even had tea. This claim made international headlines and was repeated by many subsequent historians. Later research has discredited this version of events, and in 2014, the U.S. Navy's Naval History and Heritage Command acknowledged in a letter to the Hudson's radio operator, who had lobbied for decades to clear his crewmates' name, that Morison's criticisms were "unwarranted." [22]

Mikawa's floatplanes returned around 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. By 13:00, he reassembled his warships and headed south through Bougainville Strait at 24 knots (44 km/h). [1] : 88 At 13:45, the cruiser force was near Choiseul south-east of Bougainville. At that time, several surviving Japanese aircraft from the noon torpedo raid on the Allied ships off the coast of Guadalcanal flew over the cruisers on the way back to Rabaul and gave them waves of encouragement. [23] Mikawa entered New Georgia Sound (later dubbed as "the Slot") by 16:00 and began his run towards Guadalcanal. [1] : 89 He communicated the following battle plan to his warships: "On the rush-in we will go from S. (south) of Savo Island and torpedo the enemy main force in front of Guadalcanal anchorage after which we will turn toward the Tulagi forward area to shell and torpedo the enemy. We will then withdraw north of Savo Island." [11] : 20

Mikawa's run down the Slot was not detected by Allied forces. Turner had requested that U.S. Admiral John S. McCain Sr., commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area, conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the Slot in the afternoon of August 8. But, for unexplained reasons, McCain did not order the missions, nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out. Thus, Turner mistakenly believed that the Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day. [1] : 89–92 However, McCain cannot totally bear fault, as his patrol craft were few in number, and operated over a vast area at the extreme limit of their endurance. Turner had fifteen scouting planes of the cruiser force, which were never used that afternoon and remained on the decks of their cruisers, filled with gasoline and serving as an explosive hazard to the cruisers. [24] : 88

To protect the unloading transports during the night, Crutchley divided the Allied warship forces into three groups. A "southern" group, consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra, cruiser USS Chicago, and destroyers USS Patterson and USS Bagley, patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. A "northern" group, consisting of the cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Astoria and USS Quincy, and destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson, conducted a box-shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands. An "eastern" group consisting of the cruisers USS San Juan and HMAS Hobart and two U.S. destroyers guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands. [16] : 195 Crutchley placed two radar-equipped U.S. destroyers to the west of Savo Island to provide early warning for any approaching Japanese ships. The destroyer USS Ralph Talbot patrolled the northern passage and the destroyer USS Blue patrolled the southern passage, with a gap of 12–30 kilometers (7.5–18.6 mi) between their uncoordinated patrol patterns. At this time, the Allies were unaware of all of the limitations of their primitive ship-borne radars, such as the effectiveness of the radar could be greatly degraded by the presence of nearby landmasses. [1] : 99 Chicago ' s Captain Bode ordered his ship's radar to be used only intermittently due to the concern it would reveal his position, a decision that conformed with general navy radar usage guidelines, but which may have been incorrect in this specific circumstance. He allowed a single sweep every half hour with the fire control radar, but the timing of the last pre-engagement sweep was too early to detect the approaching Japanese cruisers. [25] Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships, Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close-in protection around the two transport anchorages. [12] : 80–81

The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in supporting the landings. Also, the weather was extremely hot and humid, inducing further fatigue and, in Morison's words, "inviting weary sailors to slackness." In response, most of Crutchley's warships went to "Condition II" the night of August 8, which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested, either in their bunks or near their battle stations. [11] : 32

In the evening, Turner called a conference on his command ship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and Marine commander Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift to discuss the departure of Fletcher's carriers and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships. At 20:55, Crutchley left the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode of Chicago in charge of the southern group. Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence, contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements. Bode, awakened from sleep in his cabin, decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships, the customary place for the senior ship and went back to sleep. At the conference, Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the "seaplane tender" force reported by the Australian Hudson crew earlier that day. They decided it would not be a threat that night, because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action. Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships, and he departed at midnight to conduct the inspection. Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location. [1] : 96–97

As Mikawa's force neared the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes for one final reconnaissance of the Allied ships, and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle. Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes, starting at 23:45 on August 8, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat, and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner. [12] : 165–66

Mikawa's force approached in a single 3-kilometer (1.9 mi) column led by Chōkai, with Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryū, Yūbari, and Yūnagi following. Sometime between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9, lookouts in Mikawa's ships spotted Blue about 9 kilometers (5.6 mi) ahead of the Japanese column. [16] : 197 [26]

Action south of Savo Edit

To avoid Blue, Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island. [11] : 36 He also ordered his ships to slow to 22 knots (41 km/h), to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible. [1] : 103 Four minutes later, Mikawa's lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about 16 kilometers (9.9 mi) away or a small schooner of unknown nationality. [1] : 103 [12] : 171 [27] The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them. [11] : 36 When Blue was less than 2 kilometers (1.2 mi) away from Mikawa's force, she suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her. [12] : 171–73 Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed, first to 26 knots (48 km/h), and then to 30 knots (56 km/h). At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31, he ordered, "Every ship attack." [16] : 197

At about this time, Yūnagi detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction, perhaps because she lost sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her, or perhaps she was ordered to provide a rearguard for Mikawa's force. One minute later, Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port. This ship was the destroyer Jarvis, heavily damaged the day before and now departing Guadalcanal independently for repairs in Australia. Whether Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, since her radios had been destroyed. Furutaka launched torpedoes at Jarvis, which all missed. [1] : 103–04 The Japanese ships passed as close to Jarvis as 1,100 meters (1,200 yd), close enough for officers on Tenryū to look down onto the destroyer's decks without seeing any of her crew moving about. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships passing by, she did not respond in any noticeable way. [12] : 176–77

Two minutes after sighting Jarvis, the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about 12,500 meters (13,700 yd) away, silhouetted by the glow from the burning George F. Elliott. [12] : 178 Several minutes later, at about 01:38, the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships. [11] : 36–37 At this same time, lookouts on Chōkai spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of 16 kilometers (9.9 mi). [1] : 104 Chōkai turned to face this new threat, and the rest of the Japanese column followed, while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire. [12] : 179–80

Patterson ' s crew was alert because the destroyer's captain had taken seriously the earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening sightings of unknown aircraft, and told his crew to be ready for action. At 01:43, Patterson spotted a ship, probably Kinugasa, 5,000 meters (5,500 yd) dead ahead and immediately sent a warning by radio and signal lamp: "Warning! Warning! Strange ships entering the harbor!" Patterson increased speed to full, and fired star shells towards the Japanese column. Her captain ordered a torpedo attack, but his order was not heard over the noise from the destroyer's guns. [12] : 206–07

At about the same moment that Patterson sighted the Japanese ships and went into action, the Japanese floatplanes overhead, on orders from Mikawa, dropped aerial flares directly over Canberra and Chicago. [11] : 37 Canberra responded immediately, with Captain Frank Getting ordering an increase in speed, a reversal of an initial turn to port, which kept Canberra between the Japanese and the Allied transports, and for her guns to train out and fire at any targets that could be sighted. [12] : 180–84 Less than one minute later, as Canberra ' s guns took aim at the Japanese, Chōkai and Furutaka opened fire on her, scoring numerous hits within a few seconds. Aoba and Kako joined in with gunfire, and within the next three minutes Canberra took up to 24 large-caliber hits. Early hits killed her gunnery officer, mortally wounded Getting, and destroyed both boiler rooms, knocking out power to the entire ship before Canberra could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships. The cruiser glided to a stop, on fire, with a 5- to 10-degree list to starboard, and unable to fight the fires or pump out flooded compartments because of lack of power. Since all of the Japanese ships were on the port side of Canberra, the damage to the ship's starboard side occurred either from shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side, or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side. [1] : 105 [28] If torpedoes did hit Canberra on the starboard side, then they may have come from a nearby Allied ship, and at this time the U.S. destroyer Bagley was the only ship on that side of the Australian cruiser and had fired torpedoes moments earlier. [12] : 185–205 [29]

The crew of Chicago, observing the illumination of their ship by air-dropped flares and the sudden turn by Canberra in front of them, came alert and awakened Captain Bode from "a sound sleep". Bode ordered his 5 in (127 mm) guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column, but the shells did not function. [11] : 39 At 01:47, a torpedo, probably from Kako, hit Chicago ' s bow, sending a shock wave throughout the ship that damaged the main battery director. A second torpedo hit but failed to explode, and a shell hit the cruiser's mainmast, killing two crewmen. Chicago steamed west for 40 minutes, [12] : 213 leaving behind the transports she was assigned to protect. The cruiser fired her secondary batteries at the trailing ships in the Japanese column and may have hit Tenryū, causing slight damage. Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force, of which he was still technically in command. More significantly, Bode made no attempt to warn any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship headed away from the battle area. [1] : 105–06

During this time, Patterson engaged in a gun duel with the Japanese column. Patterson received a shell hit aft, causing moderate damage and killing 10 crew members. Patterson continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships and may have hit Kinugasa, causing moderate damage. [1] : 107 Patterson then lost sight of the Japanese column as it headed northeast along the eastern shore of Savo Island. [12] : 207 Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column one or two of which may have hit Canberra. Bagley played no further role in the battle. [11] : 38–39 Yūnagi exchanged non-damaging gunfire with Jarvis before exiting the battle area to the west with the intention of eventually rejoining the Japanese column north and west of Savo Island. [16] : 199 [30]

At 01:44, as Mikawa's ships headed towards the Allied northern force, Tenryū and Yūbari split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course. Furutaka, either because of a steering problem, [12] : 208 or to avoid a possible collision with Canberra, followed Yūbari and Tenryū. Thus, the Allied northern force was about to be enveloped and attacked from two sides. [1] : 107–08

Action north of Savo Edit

When Mikawa's ships attacked the Allied southern force, the captains of all three U.S. northern force cruisers were asleep, with their ships steaming quietly at 10 knots (19 km/h). [11] : 40–47 Although crewmen on all three ships observed flares or gunfire from the battle south of Savo or else received Patterson ' s warning of threatening ships entering the area, it took some time for the crews to go from Condition II to full alert. [12] : 217–21 At 01:44, the Japanese cruisers began firing torpedoes at the northern force. At 01:50, they aimed powerful searchlights at the three northern cruisers and opened fire with their guns. [1] : 107

Astoria ' s bridge crew called general quarters upon sighting the flares south of Savo, around 01:49. At 01:52, shortly after the Japanese searchlights came on and shells began falling around the ship, Astoria ' s main gun director crews spotted the Japanese cruisers and opened fire. Astoria ' s captain, awakened to find his ship in action, rushed to the bridge and ordered a ceasefire, fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces. As shells continued to cascade around his ship, the captain ordered firing resumed less than a minute later. Chōkai had found the range, and Astoria was quickly hit by numerous shells and set afire. [11] : 41–44 [31] Between 02:00 and 02:15, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chōkai in pounding Astoria, destroying the cruiser's engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt. At 02:16, one of Astoria ' s remaining operational main gun turrets fired at Kinugasa ' s searchlight, but missed and hit Chōkai ' s forward turret, putting the turret out of action and causing moderate damage to the ship. [12] : 231

Quincy had also seen the aircraft flares over the southern ships, received Patterson ' s warning, and had just sounded general quarters and was coming alert when the searchlights from the Japanese column came on. Quincy ' s captain gave the order to commence firing, but the gun crews were not ready. Within a few minutes, Quincy was caught in a crossfire between Aoba, Furutaka, and Tenryū, and was hit heavily and set afire. Quincy ' s captain ordered his cruiser to charge towards the eastern Japanese column, but as she turned to do so Quincy was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryū, causing severe damage. Quincy managed to fire a few main gun salvos, one of which hit Chōkai ' s chart room 6 meters (20 ft) from Admiral Mikawa and killed or wounded 36 men, although Mikawa was not injured. At 02:10, incoming shells killed or wounded almost all of Quincy ' s bridge crew, including the captain. At 02:16, the cruiser was hit by a torpedo from Aoba, and the ship's remaining guns were silenced. Quincy ' s assistant gunnery officer, sent to the bridge to ask for instructions, reported on what he found:

When I reached the bridge level, I found it a shambles of dead bodies with only three or four people still standing. In the Pilot House itself the only person standing was the signalman at the wheel who was vainly endeavoring to check the ship's swing to starboard to bring her to port. On questioning him I found out that the Captain, who at that time was laying [sic] near the wheel, had instructed him to beach the ship and he was trying to head for Savo Island, distant some four miles (6 km) on the port quarter. I stepped to the port side of the Pilot House, and looked out to find the island and noted that the ship was heeling rapidly to port, sinking by the bow. At that instant the Captain straightened up and fell back, apparently dead, without having uttered any sound other than a moan.

Quincy sank, bow first, at 02:38. [1] : 111–13

Like Quincy and Astoria, Vincennes also sighted the aerial flares to the south, and furthermore, actually sighted gunfire from the southern engagement. At 01:50, when the U.S. cruisers were illuminated by the Japanese searchlights, Vincennes hesitated to open fire, believing that the searchlight's source might be friendly ships. Shortly thereafter, Kako opened fire on Vincennes which responded with her own gunfire at 01:53. [11] : 47 As Vincennes began to receive damaging shell hits, her commander, U.S. Captain Frederick L. Riefkohl, ordered an increase of speed to 25 knots (46 km/h), but shortly thereafter, at 01:55, two torpedoes from Chōkai hit, causing heavy damage. Kinugasa now joined Kako in pounding Vincennes. Vincennes scored one hit on Kinugasa causing moderate damage to her steering engines. The rest of the Japanese ships also fired and hit Vincennes up to 74 times, and, at 02:03, another torpedo hit her, this time from Yūbari. With all boiler rooms destroyed, Vincennes came to a halt, burning "everywhere" and listing to port. At 02:16, Riefkohl ordered the crew to abandon ship, and Vincennes sank at 02:50. [12] : 225–28

During the engagement, the U.S. destroyers Helm and Wilson struggled to see the Japanese ships. Both destroyers briefly fired at Mikawa's cruisers but caused no damage and received no damage to themselves. [1] : 114

At 02:16, the Japanese columns ceased fire on the northern Allied force as they moved out of range around the north side of Savo Island. Ralph Talbot encountered Furutaka, Tenryū, and Yūbari as they cleared Savo Island. The Japanese ships fixed the U.S. destroyer with searchlights and hit her several times with gunfire, causing heavy damage, but Ralph Talbot escaped into a nearby rain squall, and the Japanese ships left her behind. [11] : 50–51

Mikawa's decision Edit

At 02:16 Mikawa conferred with his staff about whether they should turn to continue the battle with the surviving Allied warships and try to sink the Allied transports in the two anchorages. Several factors influenced his ultimate decision. His ships were scattered and would take some time to regroup. [1] : 115 His ships would need to reload their torpedo tubes, a labor-intensive task that would take some time. Mikawa also did not know the number and locations of any remaining Allied warships and his ships had expended much of their ammunition. [16] : 201

More importantly, Mikawa had no air cover and believed that U.S. aircraft carriers were in the area. Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more heavy cruisers in production, and thus would be unable to replace any he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal. [9] : 362 He was unaware that the U.S. carriers had withdrawn from the battle area and would not be a threat the next day. Although several of Mikawa's staff urged an attack on the Allied transports, the consensus was to withdraw from the battle area. [12] : 237–39 Therefore, at 02:20, Mikawa ordered his ships to retire. [11] : 53

Allied Edit

At 04:00 on August 9 Patterson came alongside Canberra to assist the cruiser in fighting her fires. By 05:00, it appeared that the fires were almost under control, but Turner, who at this time intended to withdraw all Allied ships by 06:30, ordered the ship to be scuttled if she was not able to accompany the fleet. After the survivors were removed, the destroyers USS Selfridge and USS Ellet sank Canberra which took some 300 shells and five torpedoes. [1] : 117–18

Later in the morning of August 9, General Vandegrift advised Admiral Turner that he needed more supplies unloaded from the transports before they withdrew. Therefore, Turner postponed the withdrawal of his ships until mid-afternoon. In the meantime, Astoria ' s crew tried to save their sinking ship. Astoria ' s fires eventually became completely out of control, and the ship sank at 12:15. [11] : 57–59

On the morning of August 9, an Australian coastwatcher on Bougainville radioed a warning of a Japanese airstrike on the way from Rabaul. The Allied transport crews ceased unloading for a time but were puzzled when the airstrike did not materialize. Allied forces did not discover until after the war was over that this Japanese airstrike instead concentrated on Jarvis south of Guadalcanal, sinking her with all hands. The Allied transports and warships all departed the Guadalcanal area by nightfall on August 9. [12] : 250–53

Japanese Edit

In the late evening of August 9, Mikawa on Chōkai released the four cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 to return to their home base at Kavieng. At 08:10 on August 10, Kako was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS S-44 110 kilometers (68 mi) from her destination. The other three Japanese cruisers picked up all but 71 of her crew and went on to Kavieng. [16] : 203

Admiral Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory, stating, "Appreciate the courageous and hard fighting of every man of your organization. I expect you to expand your exploits and you will make every effort to support the land forces of the Imperial army which are now engaged in a desperate struggle." Later on, though, when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed an opportunity to destroy the Allied transports, he was intensely criticised by his comrades. [12] : 267

From the time of the battle until several months later, almost all Allied supplies and reinforcements sent to Guadalcanal came by transports in small convoys, mainly during daylight hours, while Allied aircraft from the New Hebrides and Henderson Field and any available aircraft carriers flew covering missions. During this time, Allied forces on Guadalcanal received barely enough ammunition and provisions to withstand the several Japanese drives to retake the islands. [32]

Despite their defeat in this battle, the Allies eventually won the battle for Guadalcanal, an important step in the eventual defeat of Japan. In hindsight, if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships to go after the Allied transports on the morning of August 9, he could have improved the chances of Japanese victory in the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception, and the course of the war in the southern Pacific could have gone much differently. Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed, the transports were unaffected. Many of these same transports would subsequently be used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months. Mikawa's decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity would prove to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese. [1] : 121

A formal United States Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn Investigation, prepared a report of the battle. The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December. [1] : 122 The report recommended official censure for only one officer, Captain Howard D. Bode of the Chicago, for failing to broadcast a warning to the fleet of encroaching enemy ships. The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers, including Admirals Fletcher, Turner, McCain, and Crutchley, and Captain Riefkohl. The careers of Turner, Crutchley, and McCain do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it. Riefkohl never commanded ships again. Captain Bode, upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions, shot himself in his quarters at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, on April 19, 1943, and died the next day. [33] [34] Crutchley was later gazetted with the Legion of Merit (Chief Commander). [35]

Admiral Turner assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle:

"The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise". [1] : 123

Historian Richard B. Frank adds that "This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to (U.S.) Navy pride around Guadalcanal, but after Savo, the United States picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history." [1] : 123 [36]

The report of the inquiry caused the US Navy to make many operational, and structural, changes. All the earlier models of US Navy cruisers were retrofitted with emergency diesel-electric generators. The fire mains of the ships were changed to a vertical loop design that could be broken many times and still function. [37]

During the battle at Savo, many ship fires were attributed to aviation facilities filled with gas, oil, and planes. Motorboats were filled with gasoline and also caught fire. In some cases, these facilities were dead amidships, presenting a perfect target for enemy ships at night. Ready-service lockers (lockers containing ammunition that is armed and ready for use) added to the destruction, and it was noted that the lockers were never close to being depleted, i.e. they contained much more dangerous ammunition than they needed to. [38] A focus was put on removing or minimizing flammable amidship materials. [37]

The Naval Commander in Chief Admiral King would order sweeping changes be made before ships entered surface combat in the future. [39]


August 1942 - Aug. ཀྵ: USAF 'sanity options'

3 years of ww2.
Currently, production of P-40, P-39 and P-38 is in full swing, the P-47 has started to came out from 2 factories, the P-51 condundrum is being solved while A-36 is being produced. Production of trainers, transports and bombers is also very good. Allison, P&W and Wright engines are being produced en masse, while Packard's deliveries of the V-1650-1 are catching up (with caveat that most of them are going in the UK for the bombers' production). US Hispano cannon is still problematic, so is the R-3350, P-47B, M4 37mm, sometimes V-1710, R-2800 and R-2600 (if it is from Lockland factory). P-38 has a host of small and not so small issues while it is still made by a single source, P-39 is too short ranged, and together with P-40 is of no use above 15000 ft, especially against Luftwaffe. B-26 over-promised and under-delivered, mostly due to the big & heavy fuselage. A-20 lacks range.

What changes can bring the short-term improvements that matter, and what for 1944-45? Improvements in performance, range/radius, reliability, 'user friendliness', firepower are required ASAP, ie. for Spring of 1943 hopefully.
Note that USA is also outfitting the Allied AFs, so the simpler & faster improvements do matter, in order to bring ever greater problems for the whole Axis forces around the world.

Not a thread about USN or Marines.

Driftless

Was there enough production capacity to make more R-2800 Double Wasp engines and swap* them in (where possible) for some of the now smaller capacity radials? Or would that have been more hassle than it's gain - due to weight, CoG issues and other engineering conundrums?

*swap on the drawing board or production line -- not out in the field

*later edit* I'm thinking specifically for the A-20, or maybe even the B-17? (It's too late in the OP for the P-50 to be salvaged I think)

Driftless

DougM

Marathag

Driftless

Tomo pauk

There is a few aircraft in the pipeline that were either irrelevant to the USAF, or were running late, or represented duplication of effort, like the XP-60 series, P-63 or P-61.
So I'd axe the XP-60 saga, and make thinly veiled threats to the Curtiss management that heads will roll unless they start increasing the production of P-47Gs. Bell will be starting preparations for license production of P-51, the P-63 being cancelled. Instead of P-61, have Northrop prepare for licence production of P-38. Night fighters' problem is not that of a problem that reverse LL can't solve, as per OTL 1st with Beaufighters, later by Mosquitoes, but in a few hundred aircraft more than per OTL by early 1944. Or even a few hundreds of P-38s with a backseater and a radar (yes, the radar on P-38L/F6F-3N etc was not as good as the one on P-61).

P-38 changes: pretty much along the lines of the stuff @EverKing was describing in his excellent thread, even if those changes are made at a bit slower pace. Introduction of second generator ASAP so the hi-alt heating problem can be easily solved, better automation of engine controls (this is mostly what Allison should be doing), that along with tidying up of the cockpit will result in far less of the pilot's workload, the LE extension between the pod and nacelles and mods to the pod so the critical Mach number can be increased while lowering the drag.
P-47C/D/G: wing drop tanks ASAP, quickly followed by a better prop. Better shielded engine ignition system for less problems at high altitudes and no interference with radio (P&W's job here).

Tomo pauk

Engines' situation:
The turbochaged R-2800 installation, after a few burning problems that saw P-47Bs being lost to the engine fire, is good enough to be shipped overseas. What might also come in handy is earlier service introduction of water-alcohol injection, in order to improve performance at lower and mid altitudes (it is already great above 20000 ft).

V-1710: finally, the improved -81 (for P-40 and later for P-51A) and -83 (for P-39) is about to be ready, that improved altitude power from bad to half-decent. The 2-stage V-1710 versions are in the works, it's much longer size not allowing for a fast drop-in installation on the P-39 and P-51. So I'd suggest Allison (100% owned by GM), Aeroproducts (100% owned by GM) and NAA (30% owned by GM) start working around the clock to have the 2-stage V-1710 installed on the P-51, so such contraption can be produced by NAA at Dallas and by Bell instead of later P-39s and the P-63. Allison is also to step up the work on the 2-stage V-1710 to improve reliability, 'total' power and power at altitude.

V-1650: currently in production is the -1 (1-stage 2-speed supercharger), 800 monthly by Aug 1942, shipped to the UK and installed in P-40Fs. The 2-stage S/Ced versions are currently being mated to the P-51s in UK and at NAA, however the 1st -3 engines produced by Packard were late vs. airframes delivered by hundreds in Summer of 1943. So I'd suggest the installation of -1 on P-51, and going with such a P-51 in series production. With a bit of luck, we should have the 1st prototype flying by October 1942, and 1st service units in the UK by summer of 1943.

TonyA

Engines' situation:
The turbochaged R-2800 installation, after a few burning problems that saw P-47Bs being lost to the engine fire, is good enough to be shipped overseas. What might also come in handy is earlier service introduction of water-alcohol injection, in order to improve performance at lower and mid altitudes (it is already great above 20000 ft).

V-1710: finally, the improved -81 (for P-40 and later for P-51A) and -83 (for P-39) is about to be ready, that improved altitude power from bad to half-decent. The 2-stage V-1710 versions are in the works, it's much longer size not allowing for a fast drop-in installation on the P-39 and P-51. So I'd suggest Allison (100% owned by GM), Aeroproducts (100% owned by GM) and NAA (30% owned by GM) start working around the clock to have the 2-stage V-1710 installed on the P-51, so such contraption can be produced by NAA at Dallas and by Bell instead of later P-39s and the P-63. Allison is also to step up the work on the 2-stage V-1710 to improve reliability, 'total' power and power at altitude.

V-1650: currently in production is the -1 (1-stage 2-speed supercharger), 800 monthly by Aug 1942, shipped to the UK and installed in P-40Fs. The 2-stage S/Ced versions are currently being mated to the P-51s in UK and at NAA, however the 1st -3 engines produced by Packard were late vs. airframes delivered by hundreds in Summer of 1943. So I'd suggest the installation of -1 on P-51, and going with such a P-51 in series production. With a bit of luck, we should have the 1st prototype flying by October 1942, and 1st service units in the UK by summer of 1943.

Marathag

Tomo pauk

Bougnas

Tomo pauk

P-40Q was the one with a 2-stage supercharged V-1710 (rest of the P-40s have had 1-stage supercharged V-1710s). That difference meant a lot - a much better supercharging system provided a lot of power above 10000 ft, and with water-alcohol injection it provided a lot of power between SL and 20000 ft. Resulting in last XP-40 (a.k.a -2) doing 420+ mph, earlier prototypes were not as sleek nor with as good the engine.
This is all good. Bad news: the engine on the -2 was not available before early 1944. Allison manufactured perhaps 5-10 of early 2-stage V-1710s before mid-1943. So pressure needs to be applied to Allison to debug and manufacture the engine.

People can note the big 3-barreled carb atop of the intake on this V-1710 E11, the big auxiliary stage supercharger to the left (more than 12 in diameter impeller) that fed the engine-stage supercharger (9.5 in diameter impeller). Two superchargers working in series = 2-stage supercharger.

P-47G was the name for P-47C manufactured at Curtiss. They (Curtiss) produced 6 of them in late 1942, or 271 all together before 1944, while the people at Evansville, Indiana (a 'green field' factory) made 1131 before 1944. By March 1944 Curtiss lost the contract for the P-47s. So I'd be threatening the Curtiss management with anything legal in order for more P-47s to be produced - it will provide useful aircraft already for 1943 against Luftwaffe's best.

Marathag

Ahem.
L-133
That started in 1939 resulting with the L-1000 axial flow engine that was sidelined for the British powerplant, that wasn't as advanced
From the wiki
On 30 March 1942, Lockheed submitted proposals for the Lockheed L-133 and L-1000 to the US Army Air Force's development division at Wilbur Wright Field. By this point the original design proved too complex and had evolved into a new design replacing the pistons with a set of three centrifugal stages, with intercooling between each of the stages. The main combustor was a "canular" type with twelve flame cans in an annular container, feeding their exhaust to a five-stage axial turbine. For additional thrust, fuel could be sprayed between the turbine stages. To fine-tune performance at different altitudes, the compressor and turbine stages were coupled using a variable-speed hydraulic clutch. The design called for a weight of 1,700 lb (775 kg) and a sea level thrust of 5,100 lbf (22700 N). By November 1942 the design had been further refined, with the weight settling at 1,610 lb (735 kg) and the combustion area using chrome-steels. The Army remained uninterested and Lockheed apparently started getting cold feet.

Nevertheless, on 19 May 1943 Price agreed to start a more radical redesign at the urging of Wright Field. He produced a much simpler design consisting of two sixteen-stage axial compressors with a single stage of intercooling between them. The first four stages of the frontmost compressor remained clutched to allow them to operate at optimum speed. For testing purposes the compressor blades had no airfoil shaping and were attached to the central hub on rotating mounts to allow their angles to be changed between runs. The turbine was reduced to four stages. The low-pressure compressor was encased in a two-part cylindrical casing with stiffening ribs, which gave it an odd appearance similar to the bottom of an egg carton. The shorter high-pressure compressor was similarly encased but with ribs running front-to-back only. Power was taken off between the two compressor stages to power accessories, with the gearbox placed on the top of the engine outside of the compressor casings.

In June 1943 the Army eventually demonstrated their interest in a Lockheed jet design but contracted for the P-80 Shooting Star, to be powered by a licensed version of the centrifugal-flow Halford H.1.

ArtosStark

Ahem.
L-133
That started in 1939 resulting with the L-1000 axial flow engine that was sidelined for the British powerplant, that wasn't as advanced
From the wiki
On 30 March 1942, Lockheed submitted proposals for the Lockheed L-133 and L-1000 to the US Army Air Force's development division at Wilbur Wright Field. By this point the original design proved too complex and had evolved into a new design replacing the pistons with a set of three centrifugal stages, with intercooling between each of the stages. The main combustor was a "canular" type with twelve flame cans in an annular container, feeding their exhaust to a five-stage axial turbine. For additional thrust, fuel could be sprayed between the turbine stages. To fine-tune performance at different altitudes, the compressor and turbine stages were coupled using a variable-speed hydraulic clutch. The design called for a weight of 1,700 lb (775 kg) and a sea level thrust of 5,100 lbf (22700 N). By November 1942 the design had been further refined, with the weight settling at 1,610 lb (735 kg) and the combustion area using chrome-steels. The Army remained uninterested and Lockheed apparently started getting cold feet.

Nevertheless, on 19 May 1943 Price agreed to start a more radical redesign at the urging of Wright Field. He produced a much simpler design consisting of two sixteen-stage axial compressors with a single stage of intercooling between them. The first four stages of the frontmost compressor remained clutched to allow them to operate at optimum speed. For testing purposes the compressor blades had no airfoil shaping and were attached to the central hub on rotating mounts to allow their angles to be changed between runs. The turbine was reduced to four stages. The low-pressure compressor was encased in a two-part cylindrical casing with stiffening ribs, which gave it an odd appearance similar to the bottom of an egg carton. The shorter high-pressure compressor was similarly encased but with ribs running front-to-back only. Power was taken off between the two compressor stages to power accessories, with the gearbox placed on the top of the engine outside of the compressor casings.

In June 1943 the Army eventually demonstrated their interest in a Lockheed jet design but contracted for the P-80 Shooting Star, to be powered by a licensed version of the centrifugal-flow Halford H.1.

Vannevar Bush made the decision to use British engines in July 1941. Lockheed only submitted designs for the L-1000 and L-133 in March of 1942. And it was only on Paper at that point while Power Jets designs were flying. It made sense to start with British Engines to build familiarity with the technology and further develop the concept through several American companies.

Now they could have given it more support in 42 rather than in 43 but the design had been radically redesigned and simplified by then, so the end result may not have been as good.

Tomo pauk

CalBear

To continue the Wikipedia article where you left off:

Vannevar Bush made the decision to use British engines in July 1941. Lockheed only submitted designs for the L-1000 and L-133 in March of 1942. And it was only on Paper at that point while Power Jets designs were flying. It made sense to start with British Engines to build familiarity with the technology and further develop the concept through several American companies.

Now they could have given it more support in 42 rather than in 43 but the design had been radically redesigned and simplified by then, so the end result may not have been as good.

Difficulty was that it WAS a long term development contract in addition to the decision to pursure the British engine. It made sense insofar that it, as was not uncommon with the WAllied effort, prevented duplication of effort. Long term development = $ maybe $. Wartime emergency development =$$$$$ (or more of you happened to have a project named B-29 or Manhattan). That being the case Lockheed put most of its not inconsiderable engineering assets elsewhere.

As far as the OP's question -

P-39 should become a pure Lend-Lease item. Soviets adored the damned things, give them all they want, to quote the movie "they'll kill Germans and gain ground" with them.

P-40 is something of a different matter. It was actually very effective everywhere except the ETO, it also had, especially in the later variants, veru good ground attack capabilities (for a water-cooled engine aircraft). If the RAAF had been flying P-40B/C instead of Buffaloes over Malaya the Japanese would have lost a good deal more aircraft (results would have been the same in the end, better fighters can only do so much) and the aircraft proved itself to quite capable in the Med and in the SW Pacific. Where it was weak was combat radius and very weak at high altitude. It was, overall, a stop-gap aircraft by 1943. If the U.S. has the capacity to make one for one production substitutions with P-38 (mainly for the Pacific) or P-47D (in the Med) then the type should be dropped into the "Lend-Lease" (i.e. reduced production) supply line since the RAAF, RNZAF, and Nationalist Chinese & 4th Air Force relied on the aircraft until very late in the war.

The P-47 is a simply glorious aircraft, exceptionally tough, heavily armed, very fast, and capable of carrying stupid large bomb-loads (build four P-47s instead of two B25G/H gunships for the ETO). Weakness is range, at least until the late war "wet wing" P-47N which, with max external tankage had virtually identical range as the P-51.

The P-51 was, of course, the ultimate expression of WW II piston engine fighters. About all that needs to be done is get more Merlins (which is more a matter of getting Packard started six months earlier than anything else)

As far as bombers the biggest changes to be considered are defensive armament and engines for the heavies and actual mission for the mediums.


World War Photos

SBD-5 Dauntless flying over USS Enterprise (CV-6) enroute to Emirau 1944 SBD-2 white 6 BuNo 2106 at Midway in June 1942 SBD Dauntless of the VB-6 crashes on USS Enterprise 1942 SBD-2 Dauntless white 6 BuNo 2106 at Midway with over 200 holes in it
SBD code B-11 during Battle of Midway SBD-5 white 10, 15, 25 of the VB-9 USS Essex during raid on Tarawa 1943 SBD-5s white 21, 8 of the VB-10 pass over USS Enterprise prior to recovery aboard the carrier following strikes against Palau SBD-3 at Safi Morocco during Operation Torch in November 1942
SBDs S12, S11 scout bombers en route to Rekata Bay SBD-5 from USS Lexington (CV-16) flies over inavsion craft off Saipan SBD-5 from VB-10 fly in formation near their carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) 1944 SBD 1943
SBD on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) – April 1942 SBD Dauntless landing on aircraft carrier during Battle of Midway SBD May 6, 1942 SBD Dauntless on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV-3) in late 1941
USMC pilot Charles Fink of VMSB-244 after 55th combat mission Damaged SBD-3 white 15 of the VMSB-132, February 1943 SBD Dauntless of the VB-41 on the flight deck of USS Ranger (CV-4) USAAC ground crew talking to pilot on a A-24, October 1941
Capt. John F. Adams of VMSB-231 on the wing of his SBD, color photo SBD crash lands on deck of US carrier SBD-3 B15 of VB-6 aboard USS Enterprise SBD lands on USS Lexington (CV-16) during the Marshalls and Gilberts Operation in November 1943
Crashed SBD 1943 SBD Dauntless over Segi Point New Georgia Lt. James K. Brothers of VB-9 inspects damage to his SBD-5 after returning safely to the aircraft carrier USS Essex (CV-9) following raid on Tarawa 1943 SBD prepares to takeoff from aircraft carrier USS Santee (CVE-29)
SBD-4 Dauntless in flight on March 6, 1943 SBD-3 B15 of the VB-6 unable to reach the carrier USS Enterprise on the deck of Yorktown CV-5 RNZAF SBD-5 Dauntless NZ5049 on Rabaul Mission 1944 Crewmen aid SBD landing on carrier
Marine SBD white 182 and 178 over Rabaul April 1944 Victory marking being added under the windscreen of SBD-3 Dauntless aboard USS Wasp, 28 August 1942 A-24A Banshee #2110 pulling target for AA practice at Camp Davis 2 SBD black 15 and sailors duck walk for exercise aboard carrier
Marine SBD white 105 in Solomon Islands 1943 SBD Dauntless coded R38 during training – color photo SBD R32 during training – color photo SBD of VB-4 landing on aircraft carrier USS Ranger 1942
SBD-3 aboard USS Ranger (CV-4) during Operation Torch Marine radio gunner Richard Payne by SBD 󈧯 SBD on anti submarine patrol over Pacific 󈧮 SBD-3 Dauntless of VB-3 ditching near USS Astoria, Battle of Midway, 4 June 1942
SBD Dauntless of VB-6 USS Enterprise during Marcus Island raid, 4 March 1942 Marines sleeping under wings of SBD on Bougainville SBD from VS-5 USS Yorktown during Battle of Midway, 4 June 1942 SBD-5 Dauntless aboard USS Yorktown (CV-10) November 1943
SBD-5 white 9 prepare to take off from aircraft carrier SBD Dauntless on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) on 3 May 1942 A-24 Banshee August 1941 Loading a 1000 pound GP bomb on a SBD-5
SBD Dauntless on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier – Gilbert Islands Campaign 1943 SBD gunner John Liska A-24B Banshee serial 42-54459 of the 531st FBS, Makin atoll SBD, F6F and TBF on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier 1943 – color photo
SBD-5 Dauntless of the VB-16 on USS Lexington (CV-16), September 1943 SBD-5 of the VS 37 over Atlantic A-24 Banshee and Jeep, 1941 A-24A Banshee 42-60881 pulling target for AA practice at Camp Davis
SBD 41-S-3 of VS-41 USS Ranger , during Operation Torch 1942 Factory new SBD-5 July 1943 SBD-3 from VB-5 aboard USS Yorktown, Coral Sea April 1942 SBD Dauntless #16 aboard USS Ranger during operation Torch
SBD-3 ground crew loading 12,7 mm ammo SBD-5 white 6 and 18, Palau Islands March 1944 SBD on flightdeck of USS Hornet, July 1942 SBD-5 from VB-16 off the carrier Lexington CV-16 fly low over Japanese installations on Param Island Truk Atoll on April 29 1944
Formation of SBD in flight on 9 November 1942 SBD Dauntless during flight operations on the light carrier USS Princeton (CVL-23), 21 June 1943 SBD-5 of the VB-10 (USS Enterprise) during a mission against Palau March 1944 SBD Dauntless black 22-C-19 of VC-22 aboard USS Independence (CVL-22), 30 April 1943
SBD-5 C29 en route to support ground units during the assault against Eniwetok on 18 February 1944 SBD-3 Dauntless of the VGS-29 on the forward part of the flight deck of the carrier USS Santee (ACV-29) on December 27, 1942 SBD-3 41-S-16 of the VS-41 traps on board the carrier USS Ranger (CV-4), 15 October 1942 Marine SBD Dauntless taxi on the runway at Bougainville 1944
SBD-5 white 2 of the VB-5 makes a belly landing on the flight deck of the carrier Yorktown (CV-10) after strike against Truk Atoll on February 22, 1944 SBD-4 Dauntless assembly line at the Douglas Aircraft Company plant at El Segundo February 4 1943 SBD black 22-C-17 of VC-22 aboard USS Independence (CVL-22), 30 April 1943 SBD-5 Dauntless of the VMSB-231 at Majuro prior to launching for an attack against Japanese installations on Mille Atoll in 22 August 1944
SBD formation during a training flight in December 1943 SBD-5 M23 makes a low pass over the flight deck of the carrier Lexington CV-16 to make a message drop on April 16, 1944 Douglas SBD Dauntless in flight over an escort carrier during Operation Torch SBD-5 Dauntless of the VC-40 at Piva Uncle Airstrip Torokina prior to taking off on strike against Talili Bay Rabaul on 6 April 1944
Ordnancemen load a bomb onto an SBD Dauntless of the VS-6 on board the carrier USS Enterprise invasions of Guadalcanal and Tulagi on August 7, 1942 SBD of the VS-6 in flight 17 October 1941 SBD of VS-5 USS Enterprise taking-off for an early morning attack against Tulagi 7 August 1942 SBD-5 Dauntless white 14 of the VMSB-231
SBD-4 white 10 of the VS-64 over New Georgia – 27 December 1943 SBD and A-24 Banshee at the Douglas Aircraft Companys El Segundo plant on March 16, 1943 SBD-5 Dauntless of the VB-16 flies an antisubmarine patrol low over the USS Washington (BB-56) en route to the invasion of the Gilbert Islands on November 12, 1943 SBD of the Air Group 12 (USS Saratoga) during attack on Rabaul 5 November 1943
SBD-4 of the VB-41 and 42 on board the carrier USS Ranger (CV-4) during operations in the Atlantic SBD-5 Dauntless of VB-16 flies over ships of the invasion force to strike Japanese installations ashore on D-Day for the invasion of Saipan on June 15, 1944 SBD and TBF from USS Cabot CVL-28 in flight on 2 October 1943 Strike photograph taken from an SBD – Tenamgogo Island, Gavutu Island is in the background and Florida Islands is in the distance. 4 August 1942
SBD-5 Dauntless of VB-16 ready for launch on the flight deck of the carrier USS Lexington (CV-16) invasion of Saipan 15 June 1944 Marine SBD white 301 over Luzon Philippines Marine SBD-5 during bombing mission against Japanese targets on Rabaul 22 April 1944 Marine SBD Dauntless white 106 leaves Henderson Field on Guadalcanal for Munda raid
SBD-2 code 6-S-14 of the VS-6 over USS Enterprise – 1941 SBD-4 Dauntless in flight SBD-3 of the VB-6 aboard USS Enterprise CV-6 during Wake Island Raid, 24 February 1942 War weary SBD Dauntless of VMSB-233 in the boneyard at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal
Brand new SBD-3 Dauntless ready for delivery – MArch 1942 SBD-3 of VB-5 aboard USS Yorktown, North Atlantic SBD-3 Dauntless of the VB-6 during Wake Island Raid, 24 February 1942 2 Marine SBD leave Henderson Field for raid on Kolombangara 1943
British Dauntless Mk I serial JS997 Dive bomber SBD-3 white 38 SBD-5 white 36 of the VB-10 March 1944 SBD of VB-10 over USS Enterprise Enroute to Palau Raid 1944
Former college football star Lt Robert Barnett in gunner’s Seat of SBD – 1944 SBD-5 white 5 over Turtle Bay, Espiritu Santo, Vanuatu February 1944 SBD-5 Dauntless White 119 named “Push Push” of VMSB-144, flown by Major Frank E, Hollar, supporting the landings at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville SBD-3 Dauntless with dive flaps extended
Major Harry William Reed and Major John Stanley Flickinger commanding and executive officers of VMSB-244, studying a map before takeoff, 1944 Marine SBD-1 coded 1-MB-1 of the VMB-1 SBD of the VB-10 from USS Enterprise enroute to Emirau SBD-3 on flight deck of USS Lexington (CV-2) 1942
Douglas SBD-6 Dauntless

Today in History – August 24, 1942 – 4 Enemy Aircraft Shot Down in One Day by One Pilot

24 August 1942 – Flying a Grumman F4F Wildcat, Lieutenant Marion Eugene Carl, United States Marine Corps, a 27-year-old fighter pilot assigned to Marine Fighter Squadron 223 (VMF-223) based at Henderson Field, Guadalcanal Island, shot down four enemy airplanes in one day.

They were a Mitsubishi A6M “Zeke” fighter, a Mitsubishi G4M1 “Betty” medium bomber, and two Nakajima B5N2 “Kate” torpedo bombers. Carl had previously shot down an A6M during the Battle of Midway, less than three months earlier. He now had five aerial combat victories, making him the Marine Corps’ first ace.

Captain Carl was awarded the Navy Cross (his second) for his actions in the Solomon Islands from 24 August to 9 September 1942.

Marion Carl’s fighter was a Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat, designed by Robert Leicester Hall as a carrier-based fighter for the United States Navy. The F4F-4 was a single-place, single-engine, mid-wing monoplane with retractable landing gear.


The Army Air Forces In World War II Volume 4 The Pacific - Guadalcanal To Saipan August 1942 To July 1944

Publication date 1983 Usage Public Domain Mark 1.0 Topics WWII, World War, 1939-1945, United States. Army Air Forces, World War, 1939-1945 -- Aerial Operations, American, United States. -- Army Air Forces -- History -- World War, 1939-1945, World War II, Army Air Forces In World War II, World War, 1939-1945 -- Campaigns -- Pacific Ocean Publisher Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. Collection wwIIarchive additional_collections Language English

Vol 1 originally prepared by the Office of Air Force History v. 2, by the Air Historical Group and v. 3-7, by the USAF Historical Division

Reprint. Originally published: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1948-1958

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

v. 1. Plans and early operations, January 1939 to August 1942 -- v. 2. Europe, torch to pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 -- v. 3. Europe, argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 -- v. 4. The Pacific, Guadacanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 -- v. 5. The Pacific, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 -- v. 6. Men and planes -- v. 7. Services around the world


Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel

Established: In the Department of the Navy by an act of May 13, 1942 (56 Stat. 276).

Predecessor Agencies:

In the War Department:

In the Department of the Navy:

  • Office of the Secretary of the Navy (personnel functions, 1798-1862)
  • Board of Navy Commissioners (personnel functions, 1815-42)
  • Office of Detail (1861-89)
  • Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting (personnel functions, 1862-89)
  • Bureau of Navigation (personnel functions, 1889-1942)

Functions: Exercises oversight responsibility for the Naval Military Personnel Command, Navy Recruiting Command, and Naval Civilian Personnel Center. Administers all personnel matters for the U.S. Navy.

Finding Aids: Virgil E. Baugh, comp., Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, PI 123 (1960) Lee D. Saegesser and Harry Schwartz, comps., "Supplement to Preliminary Inventory No. 123, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel," NM 74 (Jan. 1967) supplement in National Archives microfiche edition of preliminary inventories.

Security-Classified Records: This record group may include material that is security-classified.

Related Records: Record copies of publications of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in RG 287, Publications of the U.S. Government.

24.2 GENERAL RECORDS OF THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AND ITS PREDECESSORS
1801-1966

History: War Department, established by act of August 7, 1789 (1 Stat. 49), handled personnel functions for the U.S. Navy until a separate Department of the Navy was established by act of April 30, 1798 (1 Stat. 553). Personnel duties centralized in the immediate office of the Secretary of the Navy, 1798-1862, assisted by the Board of Navy Commissioners, established by act of February 7, 1815 (3 Stat. 202), and abolished by act of August 31, 1842 (5 Stat. 579). Responsibility for detailing (assigning) officers delegated to Office of Detail, 1861 (SEE 24.4). Responsibility for enlisting and recruiting navy personnel assigned to Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, 1862 (SEE 24.5). Personnel functions of Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting transferred to Bureau of Navigation, 1889. Bureau of Navigation redesignated Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1942. SEE 24.1.

24.2.1 Correspondence

Textual Records: Letters sent to the President, Congressmen, and Executive departments, 1877-1911 the Secretary of the Navy, naval establishments, and officers, 1850-1911 commandants, 1862- 1911 and enlisted personnel and apprentices, 1864-1911. Letters sent concerning civilian personnel, 1903-9 and aviation, 1911- 12. General letters sent, 1885-96. Miscellaneous letters sent, 1862-1911. Letters received, 1862-89. General correspondence (6,043 ft.), 1889-1945, with record cards, 1903-25 subject cards, 1903-45 and history cards, 1925-42. Indexes and registers of letters sent and received, and of general correspondence, 1862-1903. Correspondence relating to vessels, personnel, and naval activities, 1885-1921.

Textual Records: Logs of U.S. naval ships and stations, 1801-1946 (72,500 vols., 8,060 ft.), and 1945-61 (12,000 vols., 6,980 ft.) with indexes and lists, 1801-1940. Microfilm copy of log of U.S.S. Constitution, 1813-15 (1 roll). Logs of the German merchant vessels Prinz Waldemar and Prinz Sigismund, 1903-14. Communication logs and signal record books, 1897-1922. Signal logs and codebooks, 1917-19. Operational and signal logs of U.S. Navy armed guard units aboard merchant vessels, 1943-45. Manuscript ("rough") log and night order book of the U.S.S. Missouri, 1944-45.

Microfilm Publications: M1030.

Finding Aids: Claudia Bradley, Michael Kurtz, Rebecca Livingston, Timothy Mulligan, Muriel Parseghian, Paul Vanderveer, and James Yale, comps., List of Logbooks of U.S. Navy Ships, Stations, and Miscellaneous Units, 1801-1947, SL 44 (1978).

24.2.3 Muster rolls

Textual Records: Muster rolls of ships, 1860-1900 and ships and stations, 1891-1900. Muster rolls of ships and shore establishments, 1898-1939. Civil War muster rolls, 1861, 1863. Microfilm copies of muster rolls of ships, stations, and other naval activities, 1939-71 (25,279 rolls), with indexes.

24.2.4 Records of units attached to the Bureau of Navigation

Textual Records: Letters sent by the Signal Office, 1869-86. Records of the Coast Signal Service, 1898, consisting of correspondence regarding the establishment of signal stations headquarters correspondence correspondence of district headquarters with signal stations letters sent and correspondence of the First District Office, Boston, MA (in Boston), Second District Office, New York, NY (in New York), Third District Office, Norfolk, VA (in Philadelphia), Fourth District Office, Charleston, SC (in Atlanta), Fifth District Office, Jacksonville, FL (in Atlanta), Sixth District Office, Pensacola, FL (in Atlanta), and Seventh District Office, New Orleans, LA (in Fort Worth) and vessel movement telegrams. Personnel jackets of applicants for and appointees to the Board of Visitors of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1910-13.

24.2.5 Other records

Textual Records: Annual reports of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 1897-1904. Naval militia bills, 1909-10. Applications and registers of employees, 1861-1915. Records showing complements of ships and shore units, 1891-1913. Watch, quarter, and station billbooks, 1887-1911.

24.3 RECORDS RELATING TO NAVAL OFFICERS, ENLISTED MEN, AND APPRENTICES
1798-1943

24.3.1 Records relating to naval officers

Textual Records: Application, examination, and appointment records, 1838-1940. Commissions and warrants, 1844-1936. Orders and related records, 1883-1903. Identification, 1917-21, and age, 1862-63, certificates. Registers, rosters, and records showing complements, 1799-1909. Personnel jackets and other records, 1900-25, including a microfilm copy of index to officers' jackets (2 rolls). Service records, 1798-1924. Miscellaneous records, 1863-92.

Microfilm Publications: M330, T1102.

Photographs (5,483 images): Navy and Marine Corps commissioned and non-commissioned officers and their families, 1904-38 (P, PP, PA, PB, PC, PD). SEE ALSO 24.12.

24.3.2 Records relating to enlisted men

Textual Records: Records, 1885-1941, relating to enlisted men who served between 1842 and 1885 (340 ft.). Correspondence jackets for enlisted men, 1904-43. Microfilm copy of an index to rendezvous reports, muster rolls, and other personnel records, 1846-84 (67 rolls). Registers and lists of recruits, 1861-73. Enlistment returns, changes, and reports, 1846-1942. Continuous service certificates, 1865-99. Records concerning discharges and desertions, 1882-1920.

Microfilm Publications: T1098, T1099, T1100, T1101.

24.3.3 Records relating to naval apprentices

Textual Records: Certificates of consent for minors, 1838-67. "Apprentice papers," 1864-89. Journal of enlistments, U.S.S. Allegheny, 1865-68. General record of apprentices, U.S.S. Portsmouth, 1867-68. Records relating to apprentices and apprentice training methods, U.S.S. Sabine, 1864-68. Register of enlistments, 1864-75.

24.4 RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF DETAIL
1865-90

History: Established in Office of the Secretary of the Navy, March 1861, to handle assignment and detailing of officers. Placed under Bureau of Navigation, April 28, 1865. Reverted to Office of the Secretary by General Order 322, Department of the Navy, October 1, 1884. Restored to Bureau of Navigation by General Order 337, Department of the Navy, May 22, 1885. Absorbed by Bureau of Navigation and superseded by Division of Officers and Fleet (SEE 24.6.4) pursuant to Navy Department reorganization, effective June 30, 1889, by General Order 372, Department of the Navy, June 25, 1889.

Textual Records: Letters sent, 1865-90. Letters received, 1865- 86, with registers, 1865-90.

24.5 RECORDS OF THE BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT AND RECRUITING
1856-1928 (bulk 1862-89)

History: Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting established by an act of July 5, 1862 (12 Stat. 510), as one of three bureaus created to supersede the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, one of the original Navy Department bureaus established by the act abolishing the Board of Navy Commissioners (5 Stat. 579), August 31, 1842. Initially responsible for recruiting and equipping officers, managing naval enlisted personnel and, after 1875, directing the apprentice training system. Acquired responsibility for supervision of the Naval Observatory, Nautical Almanac Office, Office of the Superintendent of Compasses, and Office of the Inspector of Electrical Appliances in an exchange of functions with the Bureau of Navigation (SEE 24.6) in the Navy Department reorganization of June 30, 1889, by General Order 372, Navy Department, June 25, 1889. Acquired Hydrographic Office from Bureau of Navigation by General Order 72, Department of the Navy, May 9, 1898, implementing an act of May 4, 1898 (30 Stat. 374). Redesignated Bureau of Equipment by the Naval Services Appropriation Act (26 Stat. 192), June 30, 1890. Functionally abolished by redistribution of responsibilities pursuant to an act of June 24, 1910 (36 Stat. 613), effective June 30, 1910. Formally abolished by act of June 30, 1914 (38 Stat. 408).

Textual Records: Letters sent to the Secretary of the Navy, 1862- 85 the Fourth Auditor of the Treasury, 1865-85 the Commissioner of Pensions, 1871-85 the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1865-83 and china, glass, and plated ware manufacturers, 1869-82. General letters sent, 1865-89. Letters sent to commanders of squadrons and naval forces, 1865-83 and commandants of navy yards and stations and other officers, 1862- 85. Letters received from the Secretary of the Navy, 1862-85 the Fourth Auditor and Second Comptroller of the Treasury, 1865-86 and the Commissioner of Pensions, 1882-85. Letters received from officers, 1862-85 and commandants of navy yards, 1862-85. Miscellaneous letters received, 1862-85, 1889-92. Indexes and registers of letters sent and received, 1862-90. Conduct reports and shipping articles, 1857-1910. Records of discharges and desertions, 1856-89. Continuous service certificates and records of merit awards, 1863-1928. Records relating to naval apprentices, 1880-86. Record of vessel complements, n.d.

Related Records: Records of the Bureau of Equipment in RG 19, Records of the Bureau of Ships.

24.6 RECORDS OF THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION
1804-1946

History: Established in the reorganization of the Navy Department under authority of an act of July 5, 1862 (12 Stat. 510), as one of three bureaus created to supersede the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, one of the original Navy Department bureaus established by the act abolishing the Board of Navy Commissioners (5 Stat. 579), August 31, 1842. Initially responsible for providing nautical charts and instruments and for supervising the Naval Observatory, Hydrographic Office, and Nautical Almanac Office. Acquired personnel responsibilities in an exchange of functions with the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting (SEE 24.5) in the Navy Department reorganization of June 30, 1889, by General Order 372, Navy Department, June 25, 1889.

Assigned to newly established Division of Personnel in Navy Department reorganization pursuant to Changes in Navy Regulations No. 6, November 18, 1909. Restored to autonomous bureau status upon abolishment of Division of Personnel by Changes in Navy Regulations and Navy Instructions No. 1, April 25, 1913. Renamed Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1942. SEE 24.1.

Hydrographic Office formally transferred to Bureau of Equipment, successor to Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, by General Order 72, Department of the Navy, May 9, 1898, implementing an act of May 4, 1898 (30 Stat. 374). Hydrographic Office and Naval Observatory (which had absorbed the Nautical Almanac Office, 1894, and the Office of the Superintendent of Compasses, 1906) returned to Bureau of Navigation, July 1, 1910, pursuant to an act of June 24, 1910 (36 Stat. 613), dispersing the functions of the Bureau of Equipment (SEE 24.5). Transferred to Office of the Chief of Naval Operations by EO 9126, April 8, 1942.

24.6.1 Records of the Chaplains Division

History: Established 1917 to centralize administration of expanded force of navy chaplains.

Textual Records: Correspondence, 1916-40. Biographical data about chaplains, 1804-1923. Miscellaneous records, 1898-1946.

Sound Recordings (1 item): "The Peacemakers," Memorial Day Navy Department broadcast on National Broadcasting Company, commemorating war dead of the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, May 30, 1945.

Photographs (648 images): Of paintings and other graphic media relating to navy events, 1917-45 (FP, 64 images). Navy chaplains who served between 1799 and 1941, n.d. (PNC, NCP 572 images). Navy religious facilities, 1930-40 (NRF, 12 images). SEE ALSO 24.12.

24.6.2 Records of the Division of Naval Militia Affairs

History: Supervision of state naval militias vested in Assistant Secretary of War, 1891-1909. Transferred to Personnel Division, December 1, 1909, where Office of Naval Militia established, 1911. Functions assigned to Bureau of Navigation, 1912, where Division of Naval Militia Affairs established by General Order 93, Department of the Navy, April 12, 1914. State naval militias enrolled in National Naval Volunteers (NNV) during World War I. Federal laws respecting naval militias and NNV repealed, July 1, 1918, and Division of Naval Militia Affairs subsequently discontinued.

Textual Records: General records, 1891-1918. Index to correspondence, 1903-10. Letters sent, 1891-1911. Organization reports, 1913-15. Summaries of units' enrolled forces, 1915-16. Naval militia ratings' qualification certificates, July-December 1916. Allowance books, 1912-17.

24.6.3 Records of the Naval Reserve Division

Textual Records: Inspection reports of organized naval reserve units, 1st and 9th Naval Districts, 1928-40.

24.6.4 Records of the Division of Officers and Fleet

History: Successor in the Bureau of Navigation to the Office of Detail, 1889.

Textual Records: Letters received, 1887-90. Correspondence, 1891- 96. Registers of correspondence, 1891-96. Appointments of paymaster clerks, 1889-91 and acceptances of appointments, 1891- 98. Lists of naval and marine officers, and civilian officials at yards and stations, 1890-94.

24.6.5 Records of the Naval Academy Division

History: Bureau of Navigation, upon its establishment in 1862, assumed supervision of the U.S. Naval Academy from the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. Responsibility delegated to Naval Academy Division, or Naval Academy Section, at an undetermined date.

Textual Records: General correspondence of the Academy Superintendent, 1851-58. Appointment letters, 1894-1940. Personnel files (jackets) of naval cadets, principally those who failed to graduate, 1862-1910. Registers of midshipmen, 1869-96.

Related Records: Records of the U.S. Naval Academy, RG 405.

24.6.6 Records of the Morale Division

History: Established as the Sixth Division by Bureau of Navigation Circular Letter 33-19, March 11, 1919, upon recommendation of the Navy Department Commission on Training Camp Activities, to maintain morale of naval personnel. Redesignated Morale Division, 1921. Transferred to the Training Division as the Welfare and Recreation Section, 1923.

Textual Records: General correspondence, 1918-24. Correspondence of the Commission on Training Camp Activities, 1918-20. Correspondence with foreign stations, 1920 and relating to ports, 1918-20. Recreation expenditure reports, 1920-22.

24.6.7 Records of the Training Division

History: Established April 19, 1917, to administer training programs for enlisted men in World War I. Reduced to section status in Enlisted Personnel Division, 1919. Restored to division status, March 1, 1923.

Textual Records: General correspondence, 1918-23. Administrative correspondence relating to training units, 1917-22. Records of the Welfare and Recreation Section, 1923-40. Morale reports, 1924-25. Reports on Naval Reserve training activities in Missouri (in Kansas City) and Indiana (in Chicago), 1923-25.

24.7 RECORDS OF OPERATING UNITS OF THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
1900-86

Textual Records: Regulations maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel relating to women accepted for volunteer emergency service, 1942-45. Records of the Administrative and Management Division, consisting of Bureau general correspondence, 1946-60 Bureau secret general correspondence, 1957-60 Bureau confidential general correspondence, 1925-60 case files of Bureau of Personnel instructions, 1950-86 and the document collection of the Technical Library, 1900-85. World War II administrative history of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, prepared by the Planning and Control Activity, n.d. Records of the Personnel Diary Section, consisting of microfilm copies of muster rolls, 1948-59. Records of the Training Division, consisting of historical files of Navy training activities, 1940-45 program files relating to the V-12 program, 1942-48 program files relating to officer training, 1928-46 records relating to U.S. Naval Academy expansion, 1962-63 and program files relating to the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, 1964-68. Records of the Assistant Chief of Naval personnel for Reserve and Naval District Affairs, consisting of Naval Reserve program files, 1946-56. General records of the Physical Fitness Section, 1942-46, and the Recreation Services Section, 1943-46, of the Special Services Division. Records of the Publicity and Advertising Section, Recruiting and Induction Division, relating to the navy recruiting program, 1940-45. Records of the Recruiting Division, consisting of issuances relating to recruiting, 1955-68. Records of the Corrections Division, consisting of program files relating to naval corrections policies and facilities, 1944-51. Records of the Policy Division, consisting of case files on changes to the Bureau of Personnel manual, 1948-68 administrative records, 1956-69 daily reports of enlisted personnel, 1914-46 summary periodic statistical reports on military personnel, 1943-71 and operating force plans for the US fleet, 1928-43. Records of the Plans Division, consisting of correspondence relating to mobilization and Naval Reserves planning, 1950-64 and chronological file, 1950-60. Records of the Navy Occupational Classification Systems Management Division, consisting of case files relating to Navy ratings, 1945-78 and board, committee, and other reports relating to Navy ratings and grades, 1945-78. Casualty Branch records relating to casualties, prisoners of war, awards, and administrative matters, 1917-53. Records of the Casualty Assistance Branch of the Personal Affairs Division, consisting of ships, stations, units, and incidents casualty information files, 1941-60 casualty notification case files for Korean War and post-Korean War era Navy POWs/MIAs, 1963-86 alphabetical listing of casualties, 1941-53 casualty lists for World War II battles ("Battle Books"), 1941-45 records relating to the sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, 1945 and VIP and group funeral files, 1940-67. Records of the Decorations and Medals Branch of the Personal Affairs Division, consisting of correspondence relating to US Navy awards to members of armed forces of foreign nations, 1942-63 eligibility lists for service medals and engagement stars, 1942-61 case files for Navy unit commendations and presidential unit citations, 1903-53 case files of World War II awards by delegated authority, 1941-48 Bureau of Navigation file of Navy Department Board of Awards correspondence and recommendations, 1917-20 and decorations and awards records from the Bureau of Personnel central files, 1946-73. Records of the Chief of Navy Chaplains, consisting of correspondence with chaplains, 1941-59 and annual, activity, and trip reports, 1949-57. Records of the Inspector General, consisting of inspection reports of Bureau of Personnel activities, 1959-80. Records of boards and committees, consisting of records of the Navy and Marine Corps Policy Board on Personnel Retention, 1966-69 and records of naval aviator evaluation boards, 1970-80. General records of the Naval Research Personnel Board, 1944-45.

24.8 RECORDS OF FIELD ESTABLISHMENTS
1838-1970 (bulk 1838-1946)

24.8.1 Records of the U.S. Naval Home, Philadelphia, PA

Textual Records (in Philadelphia): Letters sent, 1838-1911. Letters received, 1845-1909. General correspondence, 1910-40. Regulations governing the Naval Home, 1900, 1916. Station logs, 1842-1942.

24.8.2 Records of the Naval Hospital, Philadelphia, PA

Textual Records (in Philadelphia): Letters sent and received, 1855-63. Journal of activities, 1870-71. Admission and discharge registers, 1867-1917.

24.8.3 Records of the Indoctrination School for Officers, Fort
Schuyler, NY

Textual Records (in New York): General correspondence, 1941-46. Subject files, 1941-46. Muster cards, 1942-46.

24.8.4 Records of the Enlisted Naval Training School (Radio),
Bedford Springs, PA

Textual Records (in Philadelphia): General correspondence, 1942- 45. Subject files, 1942-45. Muster cards, 1942-44.

24.8.5 Records of the V-12 Unit, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH

Textual Records (in Boston): General correspondence, 1942-46. Subject files, 1942-46.

24.8.6 Records of the Naval Midshipmen's School, Northwestern
University, Evanston, IL

Textual Records (in Chicago): General correspondence, 1941-45. Records of the supply officer, 1941-45.

24.8.7 Records of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, Yale
University, New Haven, CT

Textual Records (in Boston): Administrative files of the commanding officer, 1941-70 and the Professor of Naval Science and Tactics, 1926-38.

24.9 CARTOGRAPHIC RECORDS (GENERAL)
1898-1944

Maps: Manuscript maps showing American and Spanish naval operations in Cuban waters during the Spanish-American War, 1898 (4 items). Strategic charts of the Atlantic, Pacific, and world oceans, showing distances between major ports, 1912-13 (4 items). Published maps of the United States, showing naval administrative districts and headquarters, 1919, 1935 (2 items). Pictorial wall map of the South China Sea, showing naval battles (1941-42), Japanese invasion routes, and location of economic products of interest to Japan, such as oil, rubber, and tin, 1944 (1 item).

24.10 MOTION PICTURES (GENERAL)
1917-27

World War I naval operations and activities, including anti- submarine patrols, minelaying, convoy and escort duty, submarine maneuvers, and training ship launching and maintenance torpedo production and firing Liberty Loan promotions and patriotic celebrations Armistice celebrations captured German equipment U.S. and foreign political and military leaders foreign naval vessels President Woodrow Wilson's second inauguration the airship Los Angeles (ZRS-3) over New York and lighter-than-air craft rescuing fishermen, 1917-18 (44 reels). Naval activities after World War I, including aerial mapping techniques, rescue of Armenian refugees from Turkey, evacuation of personnel from grounded and burning ships, escort duty, and training, 1918-27 (57 reels).

24.11 SOUND RECORDINGS (GENERAL)

24.12 STILL PICTURES (GENERAL)
1892-1945

Photographs (483 images): Artwork on navy subjects, portraits of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and a bronze relief of George Washington at Valley Forge, 1917-45 (PNCP, 13 images). Designs for medals and awards, views of navy ships and personnel, Egyptian scenes, and portrait and statue of John Paul Jones, 1892-1935 (PM, 70 images). Ships, aircraft, recruiting posters, and navy personnel, including the members of the Naval Aeronautical Expedition (1917), 1917-19 (PNA, 400 images).

Photographic Prints (4,745 images): President Herbert Hoover and crews of U.S.S. Saratoga and U.S.S. Mississippi, 1930 (H, 1 image). U.S. Navy enlisted personnel who were commended or who died during World War I, reserve officers, and officers of U.S.S. Arethusa, 1915-19 (CD, RP, RPA 4,096 images). Aircraft NC-2 and crew following transatlantic flight, 1919 (GC, 5 images). Navy training camps and schools, ca. 1916-20 (PAN, TC 579 images). Spanish naval vessels and damage to ships during the Spanish- American War, 1895-98 (FS, 64 images).

Lantern Slides (78 images): Humorous views of navy life used by the Navy Recruiting Bureau, New York City, 1925 (RS).

Color Slides: ca. 1860-ca. 1985 Navy recruiting posters, 1985 (NP, 47 images).

Posters (167 images): Recruiting for service in the U.S. Coast Guard, WAVES, Seabees, and other navy units and programs, 1917-87 (bulk 1941-45, 1970-87) (DP, PO).

SEE Photographs UNDER 24.3.1 and 24.6.1.

24.13 MACHINE-READABLE RECORDS (GENERAL)

Navy Military Personnel Command officers master file, FY 1990 (1 data set) officer history file, FY 1991-92 (2 data sets) and officer attrition file, ca. 1977-92 (2 data sets).

Bibliographic note: Web version based on Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States. Compiled by Robert B. Matchette et al. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1995.
3 volumes, 2428 pages.

This Web version is updated from time to time to include records processed since 1995.


Contents

Egypt was not granted true independence until Mohammed Naguib became president

In 1882 Ahmed Urabi led a revolt of Egyptian military officers and commoners against European and Ottoman domination of Egypt. A British expeditionary force crushed this revolt and while this was meant to be a temporary intervention, British troops stayed in Egypt, marking the beginning of British occupation and the virtual inclusion of Egypt within the British Empire. In deference to growing nationalism after World War I, the UK unilaterally declared Egyptian independence in 1922. British influence, however, continued to dominate Egypt's political life and fostered fiscal, administrative, military and governmental reforms.


General Leslie Groves

On September 17, 1942, the Army appointed Colonel Leslie R. Groves (promoted to Brigadier General six days later) to head the effort. Groves was an engineer with impressive credentials, including supervising the construction of the Pentagon, and, more importantly, had strong administrative abilities. Within two days Groves acted to obtain the Tennessee site and secured a higher priority rating for project materials. In addition, Groves moved the Manhattan Engineer District headquarters from New York to Washington. He quickly recognized the talents of Marshall's deputy, Col. Kenneth D. Nichols, and arranged for Nichols to work as his chief aide and troubleshooter throughout the war.


The Germans’ summer offensive in southern Russia, 1942

The German plan to launch another great summer offensive crystallized in the early months of 1942. Hitler’s decision was influenced by his economists, who mistakenly told him that Germany could not continue the war unless it obtained petroleum supplies from the Caucasus. Hitler was the more responsive to such arguments because they coincided with his belief that another German offensive would so drain the Soviet Union’s manpower that the U.S.S.R. would be unable to continue the war. His thinking was shared by his generals, who had been awed by the prodigality with which the Soviets squandered their troops in the fighting of 1941 and the spring of 1942. By this time at least 4,000,000 Soviet troops had been killed, wounded, or captured, while German casualties totaled only 1,150,000.

In the early summer of 1942 the German southern line ran from Orël southward east of Kursk, through Belgorod, and east of Kharkov down to the loop of the Soviet salient opposite Izyum, beyond which it veered southeastward to Taganrog, on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov. Before the Germans were ready for their principal offensive, the Red Army in May started a drive against Kharkov but this premature effort actually served the Germans’ purposes, since it not only preempted the Soviet reserves but also provoked an immediate counterstroke against its southern flank, where the Germans broke into the salient and reached the Donets River near Izyum. The Germans captured 240,000 Soviet prisoners in the encirclement that followed. In May also the Germans drove the Soviet defenders of the Kerch Peninsula out of Crimea and on June 3 the Germans began an assault against Sevastopol, which, however, held out for a month.

The Germans’ crossing of the Donets near Izyum on June 10, 1942, was the prelude to their summer offensive, which was launched at last on June 28: Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs’s Army Group B, from the Kursk–Belgorod sector of the front, struck toward the middle Don River opposite Voronezh, whence General Friedrich Paulus’ 6th Army was to wheel southeastward against Stalingrad ( Volgograd) and List’s Army Group A, from the front south of Kharkov, with Kleist’s 1st Panzer Army, struck toward the lower Don to take Rostov and to thrust thence northeastward against Stalingrad as well as southward into the vast oil fields of Caucasia. Army Group B swept rapidly across a 100-mile stretch of plain to the Don and captured Voronezh on July 6. The 1st Panzer Army drove 250 miles from its starting line and captured Rostov on July 23. Once his forces had reached Rostov, Hitler decided to split his troops so that they could both invade the rest of the Caucasus and take the important industrial city of Stalingrad on the Volga River, 220 miles northeast of Rostov. This decision was to have fatal consequences for the Germans, since they lacked the resources to successfully take and hold both of these objectives.

Maikop (Maykup), the great oil centre 200 miles south of Rostov, fell to Kleist’s right-hand column on August 9, and Pyatigorsk, 150 miles east of Maikop, fell to his centre on the same day, while the projected thrust against Stalingrad, in the opposite direction from Rostov, was being developed. Shortage of fuel, however, slowed the pace of Kleist’s subsequent southeastward progress through the Caucasian mountains and, after forcing a passage over the Terek River near Mozdok early in September, he was halted definitively just south of that river. From the end of October 1942 the Caucasian front was stabilized but the titanic struggle for Stalingrad, draining manpower that might have won victory for the Germans in Caucasia, was to rage on, fatefully, for three more months (see below Stalingrad and the German retreat, summer 1942–February 1943). Already, however, it was evident that Hitler’s new offensive had fallen short of its objectives, and the scapegoat this time was Halder, who was superseded by Kurt Zeitzler as chief of the army general staff.


Watch the video: 1942. Серия 12 2011


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